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Follow the Money: Methods for Identifying  
Consumption and Investment Responses to a Liquidity Shock 
 





Identifying the impacts of liquidity shocks on spending decisions is difficult methodologically 
but important for theory, practice, and policy. Using seven different methods on microenterprise 
loan applicants, we find striking results. Borrowers report uses of loan proceeds strategically, and 
more generally their reporting depends on elicitation method. Borrowers also interpret loan use 
questions differently than the key counterfactual: spending that would not have occurred sans 
loan. We identify the counterfactual using random assignment of loan approvals and short-run 
follow-up elicitation of major household and business cash outflows, and estimate that about 
100% of loan-financed spending is on business inventory. 
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What are the impacts of liquidity shocks on the consumption and investment decisions of 
households and small businesses? Answers to this que tion have implications for the theory, 
practice, and regulation of credit, as well as for modeling intertemporal consumer choice. They 
shed light on perceived returns to investment, and o  the extent to which constraints bind more 
for some types of household spending than others. Estimating impacts of liquidity shocks matters 
in many domains, for example in understanding household leveraging and deleveraging 
decisions in the wake of credit supply shocks,1 as well as evaluating interventions such as 
business grants,2 unconditional cash transfers,3 and microcredit expansions.4 
Papers that track responses to liquidity shocks often focus on estimating medium- and long-
term effects by measuring spending patterns, balance sheets, or summary statistics of financial 
conditions several months or years post-shock. Thisreduced-form evidence has proven quite 
useful, but it often leaves the mechanism underlying a y change unidentified. For each possible 
state of the world many months post-liquidity shock -- high enterprise growth relative to 
baseline, low enterprise growth, consumption growth, etc. -- there are many paths from the 
liquidity change to that outcome. Identifying mechanisms is important because different paths 
can have different welfare implications. 
To take an example closest to the setting we examine in this paper, many microcredit impact 
evaluations do not find significant effects of micro edit on enterprise scale or profitability one 
or two years post-intervention, even when the loans are targeted to those who are 
microentrepreneurs at baseline.5 There are at least three possible explanations for these findings: 
1) impacts only materialize over longer horizons due to compounded benefits, adjustment, etc. 
This hypothesis often motivates researchers and program advocates to highlight the value of 
longer-term outcome data; 2) microentrepreneurs do not actually invest marginal liquidity in 
their businesses, perhaps because they are credit constrained on the margin and have household 
investment or consumption smoothing with a higher expected return on investment (in utility 
terms) than business investment; 3) microentrepreneurs do invest microloan proceeds in their 
businesses, but these investments do not end up earning  positive net return.  
The second and third explanations highlight the value of very short-run data on spending 
decisions post-shock: “following the money” from liqu dity to spending decisions can reveal the 
                                                          
1 See e.g. Hall (2011), Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Mian and Sufi (2012). 
2 See e.g. Fafchamps et al (2013), Karlan, Knight and Udry (2013), and de Mel, McKenzie and Woodruff (2008). 
3 See e.g. Benhassine et al  (2013), Blattman, Fialaand Martinez (2012), Haushofer and Shapiro (2013), Karlan et 
al. (2013).  
4 See e.g. Angelucci, Karlan and Zinman (2013), Attanasio et al (2011) , Augsburg et al (2012), Banerjee et al 
(2013), Crepon et al (2011), Karlan and Zinman (2010), Karlan and Zinman (2011), and Tarozzi, Desai and Johnson  
(2013). 
5
 See the studies cited in the previous footnote, with the exception of Karlan and Zinman (2010), which examines 
untargeted consumer loans. 
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mechanisms underlying the paths from shock to outcomes. If the second explanation is accurate 
that motivates further attempts to identify causes, consequences, and cures for credit constraints. 
If the third explanations is accurate that motivates further attempts to understand why 
entrepreneurs make investments that, ex-post at leas , do not yield a positive net return on 
average (Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen 2002; Anagol, Etang, and Karlan 2013; Karlan, 
Knight, and Udry 2013).6  
To take another example, Mian and Sufi (2011) find that borrowing against rising home 
values by existing homeowners drove a significant fraction of both the rise in U.S. household 
leverage from 2002 to 2006 and the increase in mortgage defaults from 2006 to 2008. How did 
homeowners deploy the borrowed funds? As the paper explains (p.2134): 
The real effects of the home equity–based borrowing channel depend on what households do with 
the borrowed money. We find no evidence that borrowing in response to increased house prices is 
used to purchase new homes or investment properties. In fact, home equity–based borrowing is 
not used to pay down expensive credit card balances, even for households with a heavy 
dependence on credit card borrowing. Given the highcost of keeping credit card balances, this 
result suggests a high marginal private return to borrowed funds. 
Knowing what sort of spending generates this high marginal private return would inform how 
economists specify consumer preferences, expectations, and other inputs into consumer choice 
models. For example, spend data would help distinguish liquidity constraints from self-control 
problems as drivers of leveraging, which Mian and Sufi highlight as a fruitful avenue for future 
research (p.2155).7 
As both examples suggest, unpacking the mechanisms underlying the long-run effects of a 
liquidity shock may require data on consumption andinvestment choices immediately after the 
shock. If one can follow the money from liquidity shock to spending, it may help identify how 
households use liquidity to try to improve their lots. 
But how exactly one might go about measuring spending in the immediate aftermath of a 
liquidity shock is not immediately obvious, methodologically speaking. There are several 
challenges. Administrative data is rarely available for the right sample, timeframe, or spending 
frequency, and even more rarely sufficiently comprehensive in its coverage of different types of 
consumption and investment. This makes survey design very important. Yet money is fungible, 
and household and (micro)enterprise balance sheets ar  often complex, so it may be cognitively 
difficult for survey respondents to identify the effects of the  liquidity shock on their spending, 
relative to the counterfactual of no shock. Similarly, surveys that simply ask about past purchases 
                                                          
6 Now consider the opposite state of the world: say an evaluation of 12-month impacts does find that a microcredit 
expansion produces larger, more profitable businesses. The mechanism need not be investment in business assets per 
se (inventory, physical capital, etc.) Rather, it could be investments in human capital (training, healt , child care, 
etc.) that enable the entrepreneur or business “helpers” from her family to be more productive. 
7 For related inquiries see Bauer et al (2012), and Bhutta and Keys (2013). 
4 
 
produce noisy data, and measurement error increases with the length of the recall period (Nicola, 
Francesca, and Giné 2012). Moreover, surveys can produce biased rather than merely noisy data 
if respondents have justification bias,8worry about surveyors sharing information with tax 
authorities or a lender that “requires” loans be usd for particular purpose, or feel stigma about 
using debt for consumption purposes (Karlan and Zinma  2008). In short, data constraints, 
strategic reporting, and respondent (mis)perceptions may all make it difficult to follow the 
money. 
We address these challenges by comparing results from seven different methods for 
following the money obtained by borrowers subject to a randomized supply shock from one of 
two microlenders in Metro Manila or northern Luzon, Philippines. The majority of marginal 
borrowers (90%) —those close to the banks’ credit score cutoffs—were randomly assigned to be 
offered a loan, while the remaining potential borrowers (10%) were randomly rejected. As is 
typical in microlending, the loans are targeted to microentrepreneurial investment, and 
underwritten accordingly, but are not secured by collateral or restricted in their disbursement.  
The first method for following the money uses three qu stions about intended loan uses on 
the banks’ loan applications. The second has a loan officer ask the borrower those same three 
questions shortly after loan disbursal. The third an fourth are nearly identical direct questions 
asked of borrowers, by independent surveyors, with no link to the bank, two weeks and two 
months after loan disbursal. The fifth is two “list randomization” questions, asked by 
independent surveyors two weeks after disbursal, tht make it feasible for respondents to respond 
truthfully to sensitive questions without actually revealing details about their behavior (Karlan 
and Zinman 2012). The sixth and seventh use the lenders’ randomizations and the two-week and 
two-month independent follow-up surveys, by comparing a listing of recent expenditures (with 
no reference to recent borrowing) across the treatmnt and control groups.9 
Before summarizing the results, we emphasize that our paper is more about demonstrating a 
methodological approach to identifying spending responses than about extrapolating substantive 
implications from our particular setting. 
That said, the pattern of results suggests three key findings in our setting. First, respondents 
report strategically. They report very few non-busine s uses of loan proceeds to the bank, 
significantly more to independent surveyors when asked direct questions, and yet significantly 
more to independent surveyors when presented with lists of statements that allow them to report 
truthfully without directly revealing what they spent. Second, even when responding (more) 
truthfully, answers to questions about “did you spend X or more of your loan on…” are different 
                                                          
8 E.g., my business did not grow from last year to this year, so I won’t report (to the surveyor, or even perhaps to 
myself) that I actually did try to grow my business by investing in new assets earlier this year. 
9 The randomization does actually produce a powerful “first-stage”: a substantial increase in borrowing for the 
treatment (loan approved) group relative to the control (loan rejected) group. This result is not surprising, given that 




than the counterfactual of greatest interest to economists and policymakers. For example, 
although 12% of our treatment group implicitly (via list randomization) reports spending 5,000 
pesos (US$1 = 45 Philippine Pesos) or more of theirmost recent loan on a household expense in 
the independent survey two weeks post-randomization, he treatment group is no more likely 
than the control group to say yes to any of a long list of questions regarding household 
expenditures greater than 1,000 pesos during the past 2 weeks (the proportion is 13% in both 
groups, for an estimated treatment effect of zero). Third, we estimate that the treatment effect is 
actually entirely on business investment, specifically inventory. This treatment effect can 
account for the entire loan amount 2-weeks post-randomization, with even larger but more 
noisily estimated effects at 2-months post-randomization. 
We believe the main methodological implication of our results is that researchers should 
consider collecting spending data on both treatment and control subjects very shortly after an 
exogenous liquidity shock. This data would complement longer-run follow-up data; e.g., in our 
setting, it will be interesting to see whether the short-run increases in inventory translate into 
long-run increases, and into higher profits.  
II. Market Overview 
We collected data with the cooperation of two different banks in the Philippines, one in 
Metro Manila (covering mostly peri-urban areas) andother in northern Luzon. Both banks are 
for-profit institutions that offer individual liability microloans at about 60% APR. Loan sizes 
range from 5,000 pesos to 50,000 pesos, with a mean (median) of 13,996 (10,000) in our sample. 
Loan maturities range from three to six months, with weekly repayments of principal and 
interest. Both banks require that applicants have an xisting business, and be between 18 and 65 
years old.  
The Metro Manila bank has operated in the region since the 1960s. It had microloans 
outstanding to about 2,700 borrowers as of July 2013. This portfolio represents a small fraction 
of its overall lending, which also includes larger business and consumer loans, and home 
mortgages. Until the end of 2012 the bank’s microlending activities received subsidized 
technical assistance from a USAID-funded program.10 
The second bank has operated in mostly rural areas of northern Luzon since the 1980s. It had 
microloans outstanding to 26,000 borrowers in 2011 and offers other financial products as well. 
The microloan market in the Philippines is somewhat competitive, as described in Karlan and 
Zinman (2011). There are informal options as well, including moneylenders. For our purposes 
the key fact is that that rejected borrowers do not simply obtain credit elsewhere: our banks’ 
random assignments to credit actually do produce a substantial change in the total/net borrowing 
of applicants (see Section III-F below).  
                                                          
10The program was administered by Chemonics, Microenterprise Access to Banking Services (MABS). 
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Our sample is comprised of 1661 marginal loan applicants who were randomized into loan 
approval or denial (see Section III-B for details on the randomization). Table 1 Column 1 
provides baseline descriptive statistics gleaned from loan applications. 81.7% of the sample are 
women, 73.5% are married, and 32.9% are college educated.11. The average applicant is 40.9 
years old and has owned her business for 6.7 years. Nearly half of the businesses are “sari-sari” 
(corner/convenience) stores. 35.8% have regular employees/helpers (i.e., workers besides the 
owner), and average weekly cash flow in the busineses is 4,901 pesos (a bit more than $100). 
III. Methods and Results 
 
A. Overview 
To better understand how borrowers deploy loan proceeds, and report thereon, we follow 
individuals from when they first apply for a loan util two months later. By that endpoint, we 
suspect that most of any proceeds will have been spt; this seems like a reasonable assumption 
given the high interest rates and short maturities. Along the way we use a variety of different 
methods to try to get at the same underlying question: how did the loan change the client’s 
spending relative to a counterfactual in which the loan was not available? 
 
 
Our methods include various attempts to measure the counterfactual through direct elicitation 
(survey questions). They also include a method thatcombines less-direct elicitation of loan 
                                                          
11Females were not directly targeted by the bank. Enterprises of this size in the Philippines have greater female 
ownership; larger loans are serviced by a different par  of the bank. 
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uses—by attempting to measure all recent large outflows from the household and business—with 
the random assignment of access to credit. The data come from four different interactions, with 
the same individual, over the course of about two months. Figure 1 summarizes the timeline and 
the data collected in four distinct steps: (1) an application for a bank loan by the individual; (2) a 
short survey of approved applicants at their first repayment, administered by a loan officer; (3) a 
questionnaire by an independent surveyor two to three weeks after the loan application and (4) a 
questionnaire by an independent surveyor about two months after the loan application.  
B. Sample Creation and Randomization 
Our sample is comprised of 1,661 marginally creditwor hy microloan applicants to the two 
banks described in Section II. Individuals applied from one of 16 bank branches at the Northern 
Luzon lender, or 8 branches at the Metro Manila lender, between July 2010 and March 2012. 
Each loan application is digitized by bank staff and credit-scored by underwriting software. For 
the purposes of this study, relatively small numbers of applicants with the highest (lowest) scores 
were automatically approved (rejected). The remaining applicants (about 85% of the pool) were 
randomly assigned to approval (with 90% probability) or rejection (with 10% probability).  
This random allocation of loans to marginal clients serves as the identifying instrument for 
our analysis of the expenditure data described in Sections III-E and III-F below. Table 1 Column 
2 confirms that the treatment and control groups are observably identical, in a statistical sense: 
regressing treatment assignment on treatment strata and the complete set of baseline 
characteristics in Table 1, we do not reject the hypothesis that the characteristics are jointly 
uncorrelated with treatment assignment (p-value = 0.488).  
C. Data Collection Step 1: At Application, by Loan Officer 
The first pieces of data on loan uses come from loan applications. Applications are extensive, 
and take the form of loan officers interviewing applicants, reviewing their documents, and 
entering data into a small netbook computer. This process typically takes at least an hour to 
complete, and includes questions on income, household composition, assets and liabilities, and 
business cash flows.  
The banks added three questions on loan uses to their applications at our behest. The 
applicant was first asked: (1) Do you plan to spend 5,000 pesos or more of your loan on any one 
household item? 12 (2) Do you plan to spend 2,500 pesos or more of your loan on servicing any 
other debt? Later the applicant was asked to provide a full listing of intended usage of the loan. 
The former two questions are designed to identify non-trivial non-business uses of loan proceeds, 
keeping in mind that the median loan size is 10,000 pesos and that borrowers may split loan 
proceeds among several different types of expenditures. 
This first step allows us to see how the applicants report their intended loan usage to the 
banks. These data will not be very informative about true intentions if applicants believe that 
                                                          
12 Exchange rate at time of surveys was US$1 = 43 Philippine Pesos. 
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their responses may affect the lender’s decision. Fr example, applicants might reasonably infer 
that banks prefer to lend exclusively for business purposes, and answer no to the questions about 
household and refinancing uses, regardless of their tru  intentions.  
Table 2 Column 1 shows that very few applicants repo t non-businesses loan uses on their 
loan applications. Only 1.8% report planning to use th ir loan on a household transaction of 
5,000 pesos or more (Panel A), and only 2.3% report planning to use their loan to pay down debt 
of 2,500 or more (Panel B).13 Column 1 shows results for the treatment group only, for 
comparability with subsequent analysis. Results do not change if we include the control group.  
Is the low reported prevalence of non-business useson loan applications driven by strategic 
underreporting? Results below from steps 3 and 4 suggest yes, although only to a point. Before 
detailing those results we examine whether borrowers change their reporting behavior to the 
bank after they obtain a loan. 
D. Data Collection Step 2: At First Loan Repayment, by Bank Credit Officer 
The second pieces of data on loan uses come from a very short survey, administered by loan 
officers to a subset of borrowers, at the time of first repayment (about one week after loan 
disbursal). The loan officers asked two questions designed to parallel the key questions from the 
application: (1) Did you spend, or do you plan to spend, 5,000 pesos or more of your loan on any 
one household item? (2) Did you spend, or do you plan to spend, 2,500 pesos or more of your 
loan on servicing any other debt?  
This step allows us to check for differences between what applicants and borrowers tell the 
bank. We might see such differences if applicants misreported strategically in the first step and 
the main driver of that behavior was concern about get ing approved for the first loan. On the 
other hand, several factors push against finding differences, including repeat contracting, and any 
desire among borrowers to appear consistent in their reporting behavior.  
Table 2 Column 2 shows that reported prevalence of non-business uses post-loan is 
essentially unchanged from the loan application. Here we find less than one percent reporting 
using their loan on a large household transaction, while 2.9% report using it to pay down other 
debt.14 Sample size is lower in Column 2 because this stepwas implemented only at one bank 
and only for a short period of time. The data collection proved onerous for the bank, and the 
bank discontinued it after we observed the strong similarity in reporting behavior between this 
step (post-loan) and step one (application).  
 
                                                          
13 As we show in section 2 of the paper our randomization was successful and so comparing the reported loan use 
intentions of the treatment and control group will not be informative at this point. The only place where comparing 
the responses is useful is in columns 5 and 7, report d spending. 
14The loan officers also asked the borrowers what they primarily spent their loans on and every borrower replied that 
they spent it on their business. 
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E. Data Collection Steps 3 and 4: 2-Week and 2-Month Surveys, by Independent Surveyor 
The third and fourth pieces of data on loan uses come from two surveys, administered by an 
independent surveyor about two weeks and two months af er loan application, of both treatment 
and control group individuals. Surveyors located inividuals at their place of business or home 
and invited them to take a survey on behalf of Innovati ns for Poverty Action (IPA), a research 
organization. Surveyors were not aware of any connection to the banks. Surveyors informed 
people in the sample frame that IPA obtained a list of potential survey respondents from a 
database of local businesses.15 
Both surveys focus on direct elicitation of loan uses and the measurement of all recent 
substantial outflows, although the second survey is a bit shorter. Both were administered by the 
same surveyor. The scripts for key questions are reproduced in Appendix 1. Relative to the two-
week survey, measuring outflows at two months has te potential advantage of allowing more 
time for all loan proceeds to be spent. It also has several potential disadvantages: more time for 
the control group to find alternative sources of financing (weakening power), a longer recall 
period (increasing measurement error), and/or more tim  for any short-run returns on investment 
to effect spending decisions (confounding inferences about the direct effect of borrowing on 
spending).  
84% of our initial sample of 1,661 completed the first (two-week) survey. Table 1 Column 3 
shows that treatment assignment does not significantly affect two-week survey completion. 
Column 4 shows, unsurprisingly, that baseline characte istics do predict survey completion. But 
Column 5 shows that these characteristics do not interact significantly with treatment assignment 
(p-value on the joint test = 0.239), offering reassurance that the treatment leaves the composition 
as well as proportion of survey respondents unchanged.  
65.9% of our initial sample completed the second (two-month) survey. Table 1 Column 6 
shows that treatment assignment does not significantly ffect two-month survey completion. 
Column 7 shows, unsurprisingly, that baseline characte istics do predict survey completion. 
Column 8 shows that the interactions between baseline characteristics and treatment assignment 
are jointly significant; raising the possibility that treatment affects the composition of two-month 
survey respondents (Column 8) if not the response rate (Column 6).  
The two-week survey begins with questions about basic demographics, health and savings. 
These introductory questions are designed to mitigate the likelihood that respondents infer any 
connection or association between the survey and their recent loan (application). The surveyor 
then asked the respondent for details on any outstanding loans, starting with the most recent one. 
Respondents reporting a loan were then asked about their deployment of loan proceeds using 
three different methods. 
                                                          
15 The goal was to be truthful yet also mask the relationship with the specific partnering bank. The surveyors 
themselves had no knowledge of the bank connection. 
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First, the surveyor explicitly asked the two key loan use questions: (1) Did you spend 5,000 
pesos or more of your loan on any one household item? (2) Did you spend 2,500 pesos or more 
of your loan on servicing any other debt? We expect the proportion of “yeses” here to be higher 
than those reported to the bank, since incentives for strategic misreporting to an independent 
surveyor should be lower. Table 2 Column 3 shows that t is is indeed the case, to some extent.  
5.5% of individuals report using a loan for a large household expense; compared to 1.8% on the 
loan application (the 3.7 percentage point difference has a p-value less than 0.001). 7.7% report 
using the loan to pay down other debt, compared to 2.3% on the loan application (the 5.4 
percentage point difference has a p-value less than0.001). Of course, borrowers may still 
underreport non-business uses if such uses are stigmatized, or if borrowers suspect a connection 
between the surveyor and their bank. Such concerns motivate our second elicitation method. 
Second, the surveyor administered a list randomization exercise to elicit estimates of group-
level proportions of respondents using loan proceeds to pay down debt or buy household goods. 
List randomization is used across various disciplines to mitigate the underreporting of socially or 
financially sensitive information (Karlan and Zinman 2012). The procedure asks a randomly-
selected half of the respondents to report the total number of “yes” answers to four innocuous 
binary questions (Appendix 1), and the other half to report the total number of “yes” answers to 
the same four innocuous binary questions plus a fifth sensitive one. We did this separately for the 
two different loan use questions: (1) I spent over 5,000 pesos of my loan of a single household 
transaction” and (2) “I spent more than 2,500 pesos of my loan to pay down other debt.” We then 
estimate the proportion responding “yes” to the sensitive (loan use) question by subtracting the 
mean count of “yeses” for those who had only had the four innocuous questions from the mean 
count for those who had all five questions (including a loan use question).16 As expected, list 
randomization produces substantially higher estimates of non-business uses (Table 2 Column 4). 
We infer that 11.5% of respondents report spending at least 5,000 pesos of their loan proceeds on 
a single household transaction (p-value = 0.285), with 19.1% spending at least 2,500 of their loan 
proceeds on paying down other debt (p-value = 0.021)   
All told, the results in Columns 1-4 suggest that elicitation method can have substantial 
effects on how borrowers report loan uses. Borrowers r port more non-business uses when asked 
by an independent surveyor rather than a bank, and still more when they can report 
anonymously. The results suggest that list randomization, administered by an independent 
surveyor, produces relatively accurate estimates of how borrowers perceive their loan uses. 
These results thus far do not address the question of how borrower perceptions accord with 
the reality that is most interesting to many researchers, practitioners, and funders: what did the 
respondent buy that they would not have in the absence of the marginal loan? Fungibility may 
make it difficult to construct survey questions that elicit that counterfactual. For example, loan 
                                                          
16 Those who do not report an outstanding loan instead are assigned the mean count of the short-list (innocuous, 
non-loan use questions only) group. Results are nearly identical if we instead drop these non-borrowers. 
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proceeds may be used to purchase inventory in the proximate sense of cash from bank being 
handed over to a supplier. But if the business owner would have purchased that inventory 
anyway, the marginal (counterfactual) purchase could be something else entirely; e.g., perhaps 
the cash flow that would have been used to purchase inventory is now used to purchase health 
care for an ailing family member.  
The difficulty of identifying the counterfactual of interest motivates our third type of survey 
question: we ask each respondent to list each houseld and business outflow greater than 1,000 
pesos from the past two weeks (type and amount).17 (Note the lack of any reference to loans or 
loan proceeds: this question asks about spending more broadly.) Together with the random 
assignment of loan approvals, we use responses to this question to identify the counterfactual: 
the impacts of the marginal loan on consumption and investment.  Table 2 Column 5 reports the 
results, which show a striking lack of impact on non-business spending. The treatment (loan 
approved) and control (loan rejected) groups have ident cal proportions (0.133) of respondents 
reporting one or more household expenses >= 5000 pesos,  for a treatment effect of zero (SE =  
0.30). 18 For debt pay down, the treatment group has a slightly higher proportion (0.142 vs. 
0.126), but the 1.6 percentage point difference is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.580).19 
We find similar results, on a much higher base, in the two-month survey.20 Regarding the 
base, many more respondents directly report non-busines  uses, whether directly (Column 6) or 
on the outflow list (Column 7).21 Regarding the counterfactual of interest, when we compare the 
treatment group to the control group we find that the control group has an equally high base, 
statistically speaking. 22.7% of the treatment group report spending at least 5,000 pesos on any 
one household transaction while 18.0% of the control g up does so. This difference of 4.7 
percentage points is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.210). Similarly, 23.7% of the 
treatment group reports spending more than 2,500 pesos on other debt22 while 19.7% of the 
control group does so. This difference of 4.1 percentage points is not statistically significant (p-
value = 0.291). 
                                                          
17 Without any prompts for specific expense types. 
18If we instead use a 1,000 peso cut-off we get an increase of 0.026 in treatment, (p-value=0.560). The cut-off at 
5,000 pesos allows us to check for large household expenditures and lines up with the direct questions that are asked 
of the borrowers.  
19 We are implicitly using the random assignment as an instrument for borrowing over the subsequent two weeks. 
The top rows of Table 3 confirms that the instrument is a powerful one; e.g., a treatment group member is 16 
percentage points more likely to have a formal sector loan than a control group member. 
20 The higher base could be due to respondents taking > 2 weeks to fully spend their loan proceeds, and/or to 
respondents’ increased comfort with the survey or surveyor. 
21 We did not include list randomization on the two-mnth survey. 
22 It may seem peculiar that the proportion of respondents who report spending more than 2,500 on debt pay down in 
the explicit question asked by the surveyor (column 6) is higher than the proportion that report this when listing out 
their spending over the past 2 months (column 7). This may be due to the fact that the outflow list has a 1,000 peso 
threshold, so if someone pays off debt in increments < 1,000 pesos but a total amount >= 2,500 pesos, the outflow 




Taken together, the results in Table 2 highlight several key findings. Substantively, there is 
little evidence of substantial non-business uses of microenterprise loans in this particular setting. 
This is surprising, given low impact on business growth in general from microcredit (Angelucci, 
Karlan, and Zinman 2013; Attanasio et al. 2011; Augsburg et al. 2012; Banerjee et al. 2013; 
Crepon et al. 2011; Karlan and Zinman 2010), findings from a prior study with one of the lenders 
here that marginal borrowers decrease investment in their microenterprises (Karlan and Zinman 
2011), and mounting concerns that people “over-borrow” to finance consumption (Zinman 
forthcoming). 
Methodologically, we find that borrower reporting responds strongly to the elicitation 
method, and that direct elicitation of loan uses does not produce evidence on a key 
counterfactual—what borrowers purchase that they would not have purchased in the absence of a 
loan. Rather, we identify the counterfactual using random assignment of credit access coupled 
with short-term follow-up measurement of substantial outflows. 
F. So Where Does the Money Go? 
If the marginal expenditure financed by a loan is not on a household item or other debt 
service (Table 2), it presumably is on some sort of business investment. Can we actually detect 
an increase in business investment, or do measurement error or reporting biases make it futile to 
attempt to follow the money with survey data? 
Tables 3 and 4 suggest that our methods can in fact iden ify the marginal spending: business 
inventory, in this case. We switch from the mean comparisons in Table 2 (Columns 5 and 7) to 
regressions to improve precision, and estimate OLS intention-to-treat (ITT) models, with Huber-
White standard errors, of the form: 
 = 	 + 	 ∗ 


 +  ∗  + 	 
Where i indexes individuals and t time, treatment = 1 if i was randomly assigned to loan 
approval, and FE is a vector of randomization strata (  bank indicator, credit score category, 
application month-year, and the survey month-year). Y is an outcome measuring borrowing (to 
show the magnitude of the first-stage) or spending, measured at either t = 2 weeks or t = 2 
months post-random assignment. Because inferences about these outcomes may be influenced by 
outliers, we present results from three different functional forms: Column 1 estimates effects on 
the level of spending (in pesos); Column 2 “winsorizes” the data, recoding the top 1% of Y’s to 
the 99th percentile; and Column 3 “trims” the data, dropping observations in the top percentile of 
Y. We do not use log(Y) because most of our borrowing and spending variables have many zeros. 
Table 3 shows treatment effects on different measures of Y over the two weeks after random 




The first panel of Table 3 shows that we have a strong first stage, similar to that found in 
Karlan and Zinman (2011) with the Metro Manila lendr participating in this study. The 
treatment effect on the likelihood of having a loan from one of our partner banks is 0.33 (p-value 
< 0.001). This is measured using administrative data from the bank. The effect is < 1 due to 
approved applicants in the treatment group deciding to not actually go ahead with the loan, and 
to control group applicants who managed to avail a loan anyway. The remaining Y’s are 
measured using the follow-up surveys. Treatment effects on measures of total formal sector 
borrowing are still statistically significant but about one-half the size on borrowing from our 
partner lenders, due in part to some control group individuals obtaining credit from comparable 
lenders, and in part to substantial underreporting of debt that is line with what we have found in 
other studies (Karlan and Zinman 2008; Zinman 2009; Zinman 2010; Karlan and Zinman 2011).23 
The next panel of Table 3 estimates the treatment effect on total spending, as measured using 
our question asking respondents to list all outflows >= 1,000 pesos during the past two weeks. 
Depending on our treatment of outliers, the estimate r nges from 4,996 to 5,696 pesos (with p-
values of 0.059, 0.038, and 0.028). Scaling up these estimates by the difference in borrowing 
rates from the administrative data (since that data is not subject to underreporting of debt), we 
get estimated treatment-on-the-treated effects of ab ut 15,000-16,000 pesos. The average loan 
size is 14,601 pesos, suggesting that our two-week outflow questions do successfully follow the 
money. They also suggest that borrowers spend all lo n proceeds within the first two weeks, 
which seems plausible given the high interest rate and short maturity. 
The rest of Table 3 disaggregates spending into several categories of interest. We confirm 
that lack of significant effects on household spending and debt pay down found in the earlier 
means comparisons (Table 2). Most notably, we find increases in business expenditures, in 
magnitudes commensurate with the treatment effect on overall spending. Disaggregating 
business expenses into fixed assets, inventory, renovations, utilities, salaries, and other, we find 
evidence suggesting that the entirety of the (business) spending increase is due to inventory. The 
ITT estimates on inventory range from 3,738 to 6,045 depending on how we treat outliers, with 
p-values of 0.005, 0.008, and 0.049. The focus on inventory may be due to the 3-6 month loan 
amortization, which may be too short for other types of investments to produce the returns 
needed to service the debt.  
Table 4 repeats the spending analysis using data from the two-month follow-up survey. The 
results are qualitatively consistent with the two-week results. Point estimates are again more than 
large enough to offer a complete accounting of the loan proceeds. The pattern of results on 
spending (sub-)categories again suggests that about 100% of marginal spending is on business 
inventory. There are two noteworthy differences betwe n the two-month and two-week results. 
One is that the two-month results are less precise. This is most likely due to the relative difficulty 
                                                          
23 34% of those we know, from administrative data, to have a loan with one of our lenders do not report any
outstanding formal sector loans at the two-week follow-up survey. 
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of recalling spending over a two month period. The second is that the two-month point estimates 
on total business expenditure, and inventory specifically, are much larger. This could be an 
artifact of wide confidence intervals or respondent reporting. Or it could be capturing a true 
multiplier whereby treated individuals reinvest increased profits from the initial inventory 
increase, or obtain additional financing from other sources, to further increase inventory.  
In any case, the suggestion that quantitative effect sizes may differ substantially over as short 
a period as six weeks—two weeks vs. two months—highlights the utility of short-run and high-




Discussions of outcome measurement following liquidity shocks often focus on how longer-
run data may be needed to measure key impacts (e.g., of investments that require longer 
gestation periods, or learning). We take the opposite tack, and test seven different methods for 
measuring the short-run responses. 
The first method uses questions about intended loan uses on the banks’ loan applications. 
The second has a loan officer ask the borrower those same questions shortly after loan disbursal. 
The third and fourth are nearly identical direct questions asked of borrowers, by independent 
surveyors, with no link to the bank, two weeks and two months after loan disbursal. The fifth is 
two “list randomization” questions, asked by independ nt surveyors two weeks after disbursal, 
that make it feasible for respondents to respond truthfully to sensitive questions without actually 
revealing details about their behavior. The sixth and seventh use the lenders’ randomizations and 
the two-week and two-month independent follow-up surveys, by comparing a listing of recent 
expenditures (with no reference to recent borrowing) across the treatment and control groups. 
The results suggest three key findings in our setting. First, respondents report strategically. 
They report very little non-business uses of loan proceeds to the bank, significantly more to 
independent surveyors when asked direct questions, and yet significantly more to independent 
surveyors when presented with lists of statements that allow them to report truthfully without 
directly revealing what they spent. Second, even when responding (more) truthfully, answers to 
questions about “did you spend X or more of your loan on…” are different than the 
counterfactual of greatest interest to economists and policymakers. For example, although 12% 
of our treatment group implicitly (via list randomization) reports spending 5,000 pesos or more 
of their most recent loan on a household expense in the independent survey two weeks post-
randomization, the treatment group is no more likely than the control group to say yes to any of a 
long list of questions regarding household expenditures greater than 1,000 pesos during the past 
two weeks (the proportion is 13% in both groups, for an estimated treatment effect of zero). 
Third, we estimate that the treatment effect is actu lly entirely on business investment, 
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specifically inventory. This treatment effect can account for the entire loan amount 2-weeks post-
randomization, with even larger but more noisily estimated effects at 2-months post-
randomization. 
Our study highlights the value of shorter-run, high-frequency data collection on substantial 
outflows following a liquidity shock. To take just two examples, if we are interested in the 
possibility of over-borrowing, the methods used in this paper can be used to address the question 
of “over-borrowing on what”? In the settings studied n this paper the answer appears to be “not 
on consumption”. If we are interested in why expanding access to microcredit does not reliably 
lead to business growth and increased profits, the methods here can be used to address the 
question “is this because borrowers invest in something else, or because they invest and fail?” In 
the settings studied in this paper it appears that any downstream lack of business growth is not 
for lack of trying. 
Going forward, it will be important to trace short-run to longer-run impacts in the same 
study. For example, a longer-run follow-up on the sample in this paper will enable us to measure 
whether the short-run investments in inventory produce long-run increases in profits and/or 
improvements in household outcomes. It will also be important to test whether alternative direct 
elicitation methods might help borrowers and researchers, zero in on the key counterfactual. 
Perhaps asking “what did you spend your loan on that you would not have bought if you had not 
gotten a loan?” would produce the same inferences, at less expense, than a randomized 
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Table 1: Orthogonality of Treatment to Applicant Characteristics and Attrition        























































Survey = 1 
Sample: All All All All All All All All 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
          
Assigned to Treatment Group 0.899 -0.016 -0.018 -0.158 -0.039 -0.044 -0.134 
(0.301) (0.029) (0.029) (0.128) (0.034) (0.035) (0.154) 
Male 0.183 0.004 -0.049* -0.091 -0.020 -0.043 
(0.387) (0.020) (0.026) (0.080) (0.029) (0.091) 
Marital Status -- Married 0.735 0.035 0.017 -0.017 0.047 -0.034 
(0.441) (0.023) (0.027) (0.074) (0.032) (0.090) 
Marital Status -- Widowed/Separated 0.110 0.035 -0.014 -0.088 0.033 -0.019 
(0.312) (0.031) (0.041) (0.127) (0.046) (0.131) 
Education -- Some College 0.255 -0.001 0.086*** -0.013 0.097*** 0.078 
(0.436) (0.021) (0.024) (0.078) (0.028) (0.085) 
Education -- Graduated High School 0.319 0.026 0.087*** 0.006 0.086*** 0.051 
(0.466) (0.018) (0.023) (0.069) (0.027) (0.091) 
Education -- Some High School or Less 0.097 -0.005 0.130*** 0.164*** 0.106*** 0.246*** 
(0.296) (0.031) (0.030) (0.059) (0.038) (0.087) 
Primary Business Location -- Residential 0.612 -0.039** -0.028 -0.004 -0.034 0.026 
(0.487) (0.018) (0.022) (0.068) (0.026) (0.083) 
Primary Business Arrangement -- Rent 0.309 -0.008 -0.028 -0.019 -0.052* -0.067 
(0.462) (0.018) (0.023) (0.072) (0.027) (0.091) 
Primary Business Type - Small 0.492 -0.002 0.036 -0.061 0.046 0.010 
Grocery/Convenience Store (0.500) (0.023) (0.027) (0.074) (0.031) (0.093) 
Primary Business Type - Wholesale 0.026 0.027 -0.002 0.122 -0.022 0.368*** 
(0.161) (0.050) (0.065) (0.109) (0.074) (0.119) 
Primary Business Type - Service 0.138 0.041 0.038 0.034 0.060 0.012 
(0.345) (0.026) (0.034) (0.092) (0.040) (0.131) 
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(Table 1 Continued)         
         
Primary Business Type - Manufacturing 0.020 0.053 0.12 ** 0.054 0.014 -0.234 
(0.140) (0.047) (0.048) (0.098) (0.084) (0.334) 
Primary Business Type - Vending 0.116 0.011 0.031 0.038 0.053 0.169 
(0.320) (0.026) (0.034) (0.086) (0.040) (0.106) 
No Regular Employees 0.642 0.019 -0.026 -0.077 0.029 -0.082 
(0.479) (0.023) (0.028) (0.078) (0.036) (0.115) 
One Regular Employee 0.185 -0.011 -0.026 0.017 -0.027 0.045 
(0.388) (0.026) (0.031) (0.082) (0.038) (0.109) 
Age 40.9 0.006 -0.014 -0.064** -0.001 -0.021 
(9.2) (0.009) (0.010) (0.029) (0.012) (0.031) 
Years Primary Business in Business 6.7 0.001 0.001 -0.008 0.011 -0.087** 
(6.0) (0.007) (0.010) (0.033) (0.011) (0.040) 
Primary Business Weekly Cashflow 4901 0.009 -0.027** -0.066 -0.019 -0.047 
(6115) (0.008) (0.013) (0.041) (0.013) (0.040) 
Number of Dependents 1.880 -0.000 0.018** 0.022 0.023** 0.047 
(1.460) (0.008) (0.009) (0.022) (0.011) (0.030) 
Interaction of all Covariates with 
Treatment Assignment No No No Yes No No Yes 
Mean of dependent variable 0.899 0.839 0.839 0.839 0.657 0.657 0.657 
P-Value on joint F-test: all RHS covariates 
listed=0? 0.488 0.000 0.000 
P-Value on joint F-test: all RHS covariates 
interaction term=0? 0.239 0.004 
Observations 1,661 1,661 1,661 1,661 1,661 1,661 1,661 1,661 
 
Notes: Column 1 reports the means and standard deviation of each variable. All other columns are OLS regressions with Huber-White standard errors in parentheses -- * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Sample frame contains 1,661 marginal applicants eligible for the treatment (i.e., for loan approval). Other regressors (not shown) are the randomization conditions (credit 
score cut-offs), bank, application year/month, survey year/month. 'Single' is the omitted marital status category. 'College graduate' is the omitted educational attainment variable. Commercial is the 
omitted primary business location variable. 'Own' is the omitted primary business property arrangement. 'Other retail' is the omitted primary business type variable. The four non-binary variables ( age, 




Table 2: Loan Use Elicitation Methods 
Data Source: Reported to Bank Reported to Surveyor at 2-Week Follow-up  











reporting "yes"  










reporting "yes"  
in list of all  
large household  
or enterprise  
outflows 
Proportion  
reporting "yes"  





reporting "yes"  
in list of all  
large household  
or enterprise  
outflows 
Survey wording found in: Appendix 1A Appendix 1B   Appendix 1B Appendix 1C Appendix 1D   Appendix 1E Appendix 1F 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Panel A: Household Expenditures: Will/Did you use 5,000 pesos or more of your loan on any single transaction for your household? 
Treatment Group Mean 0.018 0.008 0.055 0.115 0.133 0.216 0.227 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.006) (0.056) (0.009) (0.013) (0.013) 
Control Group Mean 0.133 0.180 
(0.028) (0.035) 
Treatment - Control 0.000 0.046 
(0.030) (0.037) 
Observations 1,493 238 1,245 1,245 1,388 973 1,095 
Panel B: Payoff Other Debt: Will/Did you use 2,500 pesos or more of your loan to pay down other debt? 
Treatment Group Mean 0.023 0.029 0.077 0.191 0.142 0.325 0.237 
(0.004) (0.011) (0.008) (0.049) (0.010) (0.015) (0.014) 
Control Group Mean 0.126 0.197 
(0.028) (0.036) 
Treatment - Control 0.016 0.041 
(0.029) (0.039) 
Observations from Treatment 1493 238   1245 1245 1245   973 973 
Observations from Control 0 0  0 0 143  0 122 
Notes: Means and means comparisons, with standard errors in parentheses. Column 1 includes our entire sample assigned to treatment, whether they were reached for the follow up survey or not. Column 2 
includes only the small subset of clients who were asked this question at first loan repayment. This wa logistically difficult for the bank, and was thus stopped after finding few respondents reporting answers 
different than what they reported on their loan application (i.e., Column 1). Columns 3 through 5 include those found for the first follow-up survey (for columns 3 and 4, if the respondent did not report a loan, 
they were coded as saying "no" to using a loan for that panel’s purpose). Columns6 and 7 include those f und for the second follow-up survey (for column 6, if the respondent did not report a loan, they were 
coded as saying “no” to using a loan for that panel’s purpose). Sample size declines from application (Column 1) to the first survey (Columns 3-5) and then to the second survey (Columns 6-7) because of 
attrition. Table 2 shows that attrition is uncorrelat d with treatment assignment. 
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Table 3: First Stage, and OLS Treatment Effects on Expenditures During the First Two Weeks After Loan Application 
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) 
Borrowing Activity in Past Two Weeks 
Has Loan from Experimenting Lender (Admin Data) 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 
 (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) 
Any Outstanding Formal Loan (Survey Data) 0.159*** 0.159*** 0.159*** 
 (0.045) (0.045) (0.045) 
Number of Outstanding Formal Loans (Survey Data) 0.181*** 0.166*** 0.166*** 
 (0.061) (0.061) (0.061) 
Total Outstanding Formal Loans, Pesos (Survey Data) 1,535 1,725 2,644*** 
 (1,919) (1,119) (788) 
Total Spending in Past Two Weeks 5,696* 5,374** 4,996** 
 (3,010) (2,588) (2,136) 
Business Expenditures in Past Two Weeks 7,031*** 6,280*** 4,523** 
(2,268) (2,104) (1,985) 
     Assets for Business  356* 137 -93 
(187) (121) (94) 
     Merchandise for Business 6,045*** 5,328*** 3,78* 
(2,173) (2,013) (1,914) 
     Business Renovations 120 -3 2 
(203) (30) (2) 
     Utilities for Business 303 92 63 
(252) (119) (98) 
     Salaries for Employees 159 102 0 
(135) (126) (111) 
     Other Business Expenses 48 -16 109 
(271) (228) (146) 
Household Expenditures in Past Two Weeks -1,676 -3 320 
(1,934) (413) (317) 
     Household Items -150 -38 27 
(248) (142) (98) 
     Utilities for Home 7 23 169** 
(114) (103) (81) 
     Home Renovation -1,815 -79 -77 
(1,887) (103) (71) 
     Education Expenditure 60 6 -112 
(174) (165) (153) 
     Health Expenditure 123 33 -42 
 (88) (64) (54) 
     Other Personal Expenses 163 32 85 
 (151) (106) (75) 
Debt Repayment in Past Two Weeks 371 98 -59 
 (284) (223) (206) 
Winsorized (top 1%) N Y N 
Trimmed (top 1%) N N Y 
Observations 1,388 1,388 1,374 
Notes: Each cell presents the intent-to-treat treatm n  effect on two-week expenditures. The dependent variable is the sum of all 
expenditures reported in each row’s category, from a question which asked respondents to detail every outflow of cash of over 
1000 pesos in the past two weeks. Each regression includes controls for the bank and credit scoring band (i.e., the probability of 
assignment to treatment), and application month and survey month fixed effects. Results are robust to not including the fixed 
effects. All self-reported borrowing measures are stock measures at the time of the survey. Amounts are in Philippine Pesos 
(exchange rate is US$1 = 43PHP). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 4: OLS Treatment Effects on Expenditures During the First Two Months Post-Application 
Dependent variables (1) (2) (3) 
  
Total Spending in Past Two Months 23,577 13,849 22,209** 
(17,046) (13,643) (8,868) 
Business Expenditures in Past Two Months 20,826 11,092 18,774** 
(16,518) (13,295) (8,363) 
     Assets for Business 28 15 -45 
(229) (154) (94) 
     Merchandise for Business 19,726 9,748 17,978** 
(16,075) (13,094) (8,018) 
     Business Renovations -561 -241 -83 
(828) (168) (71) 
     Utilities for Business 237 26 117 
(382) (235) (174) 
     Salaries for Employees 584 195 -172 
(500) (374) (316) 
     Other Business Expenses 813 46 -160 
(525) (274) (252) 
Household Expenditure in Past Two Months 699 -63 457 
(1,746) (1,204) (901) 
     Household Items 287 345 273 
(503) (349) (275) 
     Utilities for Home -32 -47 30 
(225) (207) (185) 
     Home Renovation 1,065 -25 -196 
(1,254) (284) (136) 
     Education Expenditure 386 288 147 
 (283) (268) (247) 
     Health Expenditure -767 -43 -3 
 (874) (213) (132) 
     Other Personal Expenses 164 2 17 
 (432) (264) (198) 
Debt Repayment in Past Two Months 1,719 622 387 
(1,618) (1,087) (775) 
Winsorized (1%) N Y N 
Trimmed (1%) N N Y 
Observations 1,095 1,095 1,084 
Notes: Each cell presents the intent-to-treat treatm n  effect on two-month expenditures. The dependent variable is the sum of all 
expenditures reported in each row’s category, from a question which asked respondents to detail every outflow of cash of over 1,000 
pesos in the past two months. Each regression includes controls for the bank and credit scoring band (i.e., the probability of assignment to 
treatment), and application month and survey month fixed effects. Results are robust to not including the fixed effects. All self-reported 
borrowing measures are stock measures at the time of th  survey. The two-month survey did not ask about rrowing, administrative data 
about borrowing is the same data that is used in Table 3 and so not reported here but results are substantively equivalent. Amounts are in 




Appendix 1: Survey Questions 
1A –  Bank Interaction 
Panel A: Will you use 5,000 pesos or more of your loan on any single transaction for your 
household? 
Panel B: Will you use 2,500 pesos or more of your loan to pay down other debt? 
 
1B – 1st Loan Payment & 2 Week Survey 
Panel A: Did you use 5,000 pesos or more of your loan n any single transaction for your 
household? 
Panel B: Did you use 2,500 pesos or more of your loan to pay down other debt? 
 
1C –  List Randomization 
Panel A:  
 
 Short Version: 
 
As with our example, I will now read five statements.  I would like you to tell me how 
many are true for you, but do not tell me which ones are true. 
1. I have a washing machine in my home. 
2. I am originally from this city. 
3. I have completed one year or more of formal education post-high school. 
4. My household owns a computer. 
. 
Long Version: As with our example, I will now read five statements.  I would like you to 
tell me how many are true for you, but do not tell me which ones are true. 
1. I have a washing machine in my home. 
2. I am originally from this city. 
3. I have completed one year or more of formal education post-high school. 
4. My household owns a computer. 
5. I used 5,000 pesos or more of my loan on any single transaction for my household. 
 
Panel B:  
 
Short Version: 
As with our example, I will now read five statements.  I would like you to tell me how 
many are true for you, but do not tell me which ones are true 
1. I have visited a hospital or clinic in the last sixmonths. 
2. I have more than three siblings. 
3. I have purchased some type of insurance in the past five years. 
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4. My household owns an air conditioner. 
 
Long Version: 
As with our example, I will now read five statements.  I would like you to tell me how 
many are true for you, but do not tell me which ones are true 
1. I have visited a hospital or clinic in the last sixmonths. 
2. I have more than three siblings. 
3. I have purchased some type of insurance in the past five years. 
4. My household owns an air conditioner. 
5. I used 2,500 pesos or more of my loan to pay down other debt. 
 
1D-  2 Week Survey 
Please list all transactions of 1,000 pesos or more that you have made in the last 14 days.  
List each item with the amount that you spent. 
 
1E –  2 Month Survey 
Panel A: In the past two months, did you spend 5,000 pesos or more on any single 
transaction for your household? 
Panel B: In the past two months, did you spend 2,500 pesos or more to pay down debt? 
1F-  2 Month Survey 
Please list all transactions of 1,000 pesos or more that you have made in the last two 
months.  List each item with the amount that you spent. 
 
  
